Abstract
Introduction
The traditional signature provides the signer with the secret key to sign a message, and the signature receiver can verify the signature with the signer's corresponding public key. But, on many occasions, once the signer can't sign message for some reasons, we hope the signer can delegate his signing capability to others, who can sign the message on behalf of an original signer. This scheme is proxy signature, the concept of proxy signature was first proposed by Mambo in 1996 [1] . In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer could authorize his proxy agent to other signer, who is called the proxy signer, and the proxy signer can sign messages to generate proxy signatures on behalf of the original signer. Proxy signature is very important in the modem electronic data processing systems, and it has a wide application in many areas such as electronicbusiness and electronic-banking, etc.
The first quantum signature scheme was proposed by Zeng and Christoph H. Keite in 2002 [2] , in this scheme, both known and unknown quantum states could be signed. The algorithm is implemented by a symmetrical quantum key cryptosystem and GreenbergerHorne-Zeilinger (GHZ) triplet states and quantum one-time pads. In 2004, Lee and C Hong etc proposed two quantum signature schemes with message recovery, one scheme uses a public board and the other does not, and the schemes provide a higher efficiency in transmission [3] . In 2010, Zou show that in Ref [4] , they found that the receiver Bob can repudiate the signature, then they proposed two arbitrated quantum signature scheme (AQS) schemes, one used a public board; the other didn't utilize entangled states in the signing phase and the verifying phase. These schemes used quantum one-time pads to ensure their schemes, but traditional quantum one-time pads didn't suit for the quantum signature. Gao shown that in these protocols the receiver, Bob, can realize existential forgery of the sender's signature under known message attack, and, the sender, Alice, can successfully disavow any of her signatures by simple attack [5] . After that, Jeong Woon Choi pointed out there exist an existential forgery attack that can validly modify the
Here H is the Hadamard transform, , it means that
Where | i c  denotes the ith quantum bit of the quantum ciphertext
In order to include the noncommutative property in the quantum signature, the paper simply takes advantage of the new QOTP use a random rotation and one-time pads. A lic e s signing capability and signs the message, and then she sends her signature to the arbitrator and the receiver.
Arbitrated Quantum Signature with Bell Entangled States
Bob: Bob is defined as the signature receiver, who receives the quantum signature and verifies the signature with the arbitrator's help.
Charlie: Charlie is defined as the arbitrator, who is trusted by the signers (include original signer and the proxy signer) and the signature receiver Bob, he helps Bob to verify whether the signature is valid.
Eve: The attacker, who wants to forge the signature or replace the proxy signer to sign the message. 
System Initialing Phase
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After that, for i  {1, …, N}, Charlie distributes one particle of Bell state
A lic e with a secure, authenticated method and the other to himself.
Proxy Share Generation Phase
In 
Signing Phase


Step S1: 
A lic e measures the three-particle entangled state | B  and obtains
, where 
Then she sends her signature | S  to the arbitrator Charlie through a quantum channel. 
Verification Phase
XOR is used to implement binary addition in computers. It means that if 
Security Analysis the New Scheme
In this section, we can show that the new quantum proxy signature scheme have the characteristics of impossibility of counterfeit, impossibility of disavowing; traceability.
Almost all the classic proxy signature schemes were based on the mathematical problem solving, such as DSA is based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP), RSA signature is based on the factoring large numbers problem. Until now, these schemes are security and very difficult to broken. However, once quantum computers are invented someday, it is very easy to break those mathematical problem schemes by Shor's algorithm.
Quantum signatures can ensure their unconditional security by using physical principles quantum no-cloning theorem and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Quantum no-cloning theorem implies it the attacker intercepted the signature; he cannot copy the same quantum bits by the quantum signature, so it means the attacker only can measure the quantum bits one-time. Therefore the attacker only can forge the signature one time, and it will destroy the sates of the quantum string. And in the classic digital signature, how to ensure the signer's private cannot expose is very difficult. Because the BB84 protocol or EPR protocol is unconditional security, the attacker cannot get the signer's private key, the sender Bob cannot get the Alice's private key A K from the these quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols.
If the quantum signature scheme is secure, it means that no one can forge the signature, even if the attacker intercepts the signature, the attacker also cannot forge the signature. 
Proof, it can know that
So, if the attacker intercepts the quantum signature, he has the probability of 
The Original Signer
means that the receiver cannot change the signature. Hence to any two -dimensional matrix If the receiver is a malicious attacker, who wants to remove T or H without knowing the signer's private key, while the new QOTP can ensure the H,T cannot be commutative. More rigorously, the paper proves that there are no nontrivial quantum operator U that commutes with both H and T operator up to a constant. So use this new quantum one-time pads, the receiver cannot use known message attack. 
The Proxy Signer
Impossibility of Disavowing
